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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
'VILLIAM C. JENSEN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

't

vs.
THE INDUSTRIAL co:MMIS- (
SION 0}_, UTAH and UNITED )
STATES FUEL COMPANY,

Case No.
10600

Defendants and Respondents.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
Plaintiff-appellant claims workman's compensation benefits from the United States Fuel Company as
a result of an injury received in the course of his employment at the mine of said company on July 27th,
1964. Liability was ~enied by the company and on
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March 15th, 1965, plaintiff-appellant made application
for hearing to settle his claim.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The claim was denied by the Commission, petition
for rehearing was denied, and this review was taken.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-appellant seeks a decision reversing the
order of the Industrial Commission and directing that
plaintiff-appellant's claim be allowed.

STATEl\iENT OF FACTS
On July 27th, 1964, plaintiff-appellant was em·
ployed in a coal mine by United States Fuel Company
as a mechanic earning $27.68 per day for a 5-day week.
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About 7 p.m., on that day plaintiff-appellant tes·
tified that while repairing a roofbolting machine he ,
ducked under its boom, hitting his lower back on a
pipe fitting (R. 28 and 29). He felt a pain in his back
(R. 30) at the time of injury and rested for about 15
minutes to half an hour (R. 31). Spencer Day, fellow
employee, was present and witnessed the accident (R.
33) . Day testified plaintiff complained to him about
his back after the accident and had quite a struggle
2

to get to the train which took him out of the mine ( R.
57).

Another fellow employee, John Colosimo, testified he saw a real dark bruise on plaintiff's lower back
in the ha thhouse ( R. 59) .
Another fellow employee, Remo Spigarelli, testified that on either the 29th or 30th of July the plaintiff asked him to carry some tanks because plaintiff
had hurt his back (R. 63). A week or two later plaintiff's boss asked Spigarelli about plaintiff's accident.
Spigarelli told him plaintiff was having back trouble
(R. 63). Plaintiff reported to work the next day and
notwithstanding the pain worked until August 10th,
1964 (R. 65).
On August 10th, 1964, plaintiff consulted 'Villiam
Gorishek, M.D., his family physician, about his back
pain and had X-rays taken (R. 36). Dr. Gorishek
diagnosed plaintiff's injury as a herniated disc (R.
7 and 14), and referred him to the company doctor,
L. H ..Merrill, because it occurred by accident in the
course of employment (R. 50 and 99).
On August 17th, 1964, plaintiff saw the company
doctor, L. H. Merrill, who refused to examine plaintiff
because he had not reported the accident to the company (R. 139).
The next day, on August 18th, 1964, plaintiff reported the accident to Leon Draper, his foreman (R.
39).
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The company denied all liability ( R. 39).
Both L. L. Shepherd and Leon Draper, plaintiff1
supervisors, denied plaintiff told them he had injurea
his back (R. 67 and 70). However, Draper admittec
Day had told him plaintiff had injured or hurt his bad
on the night in question (R. 75).
Frank Stevenson, union official, testified the com
pany's superintendent, Max Robb, told him that plain·
tiff was claiming an injury to bis back (R. 77).
After being off work two weeks, plaintiff went
back to work on August 25th, 1964, and worked untu
October 23rd, 1964, when he ceased working becaust
of severe back pain and numbness in his left leg (R
49).
Dr. Gorishek, the family physician, referred plaintiff to Chester B. Powell, M.D., a Neurosurgeon for
evaluation and anticipated surgical treatment (R. 8).
Dr. Powell found plaintiff to be totally disabled in·
eluding atrophy in the left leg (R. 12).
Plaintiff was hospitalized between December 18th,
1964, and December 26th, 1964, for severe left sciatica
and on December 21st, 1964 plaintiff underwent surgery
(R. 8 to 14). An interlaminar exploration was per·
formed and a lumbrosacral left disc was removed.
Both Dr. Gorishek and Dr. Powell indicate peti·
tioner's back injury was due to the accident (R. 6 and
R. 8).
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On June 18th, 1965, a hearing was held before
The Industrial Commission of Utah (R. 22 to 87).
On June 29th, 1965, after the hearing the matter
was referred to the medical panel with the direction
that "the panel has no jurisdiction to make a finding
on the occurrence of an accident" (R. 87).
On July 26th, 1965, plaintiff entered the hospital,
had a myleogram on July 27th and on July 29th further
disc material was excised and a fusion was performed
(R. 88 and 120).
On August 13th, 1965, the medical panel made its
report ( R. 92 to 98) .
On September 8th, 1965, plaintiff objected to
the findings of the medical ·panel in writing (R. 109
to llO).
On November 12th, 1965, a further hearing was
held ( R. ll4 to 146). At that hearing one of the panel
members, Boyd G. Holbrook, M.D., testified that plaintiff's back condition was asymptomatic prior to accident (R. 116); that there was no history of any complaint or injury to plaintiff's back except an accident
in 1958 which occurred while plaintiff was working for
defendant, United States Fuel Company (R. ll7)
and that there was no history of any lost time or of
any treatment to plaintiff's back prior to the accident
(R. 117). In addition the panel made no evaluation
of any permanent disability to plaintiff ( R. ll 7). Nor
did the panel have the plaintiff disrobe (R. 119), nor
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did they make even a routine orthopedic examination
of the plaintiff (R. ll9). Dr. Holbrook, did, however
testify that if the plaintiff suffered a blow in the region'
of the protruded disc, it could have resulted in injury
or disability ( R. 124). Dr. Holbrook further testified
it was more reasonably probable that the protrusion
of plaintiff's disc would have occurred even if the accident had not occurred ( R. 138).
By letter, dated October 26th, 1965, Dr. Gorishek
asked Dr. Powell whether the plaintiff's injury aggravated his condition (R. ll2}.
In reply Dr. Powell stated that plaintiff's history
plus seven years interval of freedom from symptoms
would discount prior back symptoms and indicate that
the injury of July, 1964, was probably the principal
injury and not an aggravaton of a prior condition (R.
ll3).
On February 14th, 1966, the Commission, by Order '
received in evidence and adopted the panel report (R.
146).
Plaintiff petitioned for rehearing on March llth,
1966, (R. 147) and on March 16th, 1966, the same was '
denied (R. 149).
POINT I
THE COM1'1ISSION ACTED ARBITRAR·
IL Y AND ITS ORDER DENYING RECOV·
6

ERY IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
There is no reasonable basis in the evidence to
sustain the finding that plaintiff's injury would have
occurred even if the plaintiff's accident had not occurred. Industrial Compensation Acts are to be liberally
construed and where there is doubt it should be resolved
in favor of recovery. Spencer v. Industrial Commission,
4 Utah 2d 185, 290 P. 2d 314. Purity Biscuit Co. v.
Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 1, 201 P. 2d 1961.
Here the evidence is uncontroverted that plaintiff's
disc was asymptomatic prior to the accident (R. 116) ;
that he had no lost time due to the back condition (R.
117); that previous X-rays to determine eligibility
for employment revealed only moderate scolosis of his
back (R. 86); that he was re-employed after such Xrays (R. 129); that he had an accident to his back
while repairing a machine (R. 55); that he felt pain
and had to rest ( R. 45 and 55) ; that he had quite a
struggle to get to the train which took him out of the
mine (R. 57) ; that he had a real dark bruise on his
back (R. 59); that he couldn't carry heavy tanks afterwards (R. 63) and that a competent Neurosurgeon
reported there was no history of any back symptoms
or difficulties except for a prior mine accident in 1958
and that plaintiff's history plus a seven years' interval
from symptoms would discount prior back symptoms
and indicate that the injury of July, 1964, was prob-
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ably the principal injury and not an aggravation of a
prior condition ( R. 113) .
The Commission in its Order Denying Recovery
doesn't state that the testimony of plaintiff and three
of his fellow employees, as above set forth, was disbelieved and untrue. Plaintiff submits that such evidence should have been accepted as tending to prove
the date of injury and injury in the course of employment. Allen v. Industrial Commission, 110 Utah
328, 172 P. 2d 669. Baker v. Industrial Commission,
17 Utah 2nd 141, 405 P. 2d 613.
The Commission's finding that plaintiff's disability ,
was an insidious onset of a protruded disc without
trauma when the uncontroverted testimony of three of
plaintiff's fellow employees is to the effect that he had
an accident and experienced trauma, is not supported
by the evidence (R. 146).
The Commission's finding that the accident was '
not significant and that the protrusion would have
occurred had the accident not occurred is not supported
by the evidence ( R. 96) . The uncontroverted evidence
is that he did have an accident and that he did become ,
disabled as a result of the accident. The finding in
question is based on a set of circumstances which did
not happen and which are not in evidence. In Jones
v. California Packing, 121 Utah 612, 244 P. 2d 640,
the Court held that where facts are proved by uncon·
tradicted testimony of competent disinterested wit·
nesses and there is nothing inherently unreasonable nor
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any circumstances which tend to raise doubt of its truth
they should be taken as established. Refusal to do so
is an arbitrary disregard of the facts by the trier.
In the case at bar by denying recovery the Commission is in effect saying plaintiff did not have a back
accident and that an accident to the back is not established by the evidence.
The Commission infers that plaintiff would have
had back trouble without an accident. The difficulty
with the finding is that there is no doubt under the
evidence that he did have an accident, and, therefore,
this finding is not supported by the evidence, and if
there was doubt then that doubt should have been resolved in plaintiff's favor. Purity Biscuit Company
case, supra.
Plaintiff is entitled to compensation because his
disability results from an uncontroverted identifiable
back accident in the course of his employment, Pintar
v. Industrial Commission, 14 Utah 2d 276,. 382 P.2d
414, and the Commission cannot arbitrarily discount
all competent uncontradicted evidence indicating that
plaintiff's injury occurred in the course of his employment. Baker v. Industrial Commission, 17 Utah 2nd
141, 405 P. 2d 613.
In Hackford v. Industrial Commission, II Utah
2d 312, 358 P. 2d 899, it was held that where plaintiff
had filed his written objections to the panel report the
burden was on the Commission to sustain it by testimony at the hearing.
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It is submitted that the testimony at the hearing
does not sustain that burden. Dr. Powell at the hear·
ing merely stated that it was more likely that plaintiff's disc was caused because of his back condition
and not by any trauma (R. 136). This bald conclusion, unsupported by any other testimony, is the only
evidence offered to sustain the burden. If such testimony casts a doubt on plaintiff's right to recover then
under the Purity Biscuit Company case, supra, that
doubt should have been resolved in plaintiff's fayor.

Petitioner is aware that in order to reverse the
Commission "the record must disclose that there i1
material, substantial, competent, uncontradicted evi- ·
dence sufficient to make a disregard of it justify the
conclusion, as a matter of law, that the Industrial Com·
mission arbitrarily and capriciously disregarded the
evidence or unreasonably refused to believe such evi·
dence." Kent v. Industrial Commission, 89 Utah 381,
'
57 P. 2d 724, and cases cited therein.
Plaintiff submits this is such a case.
As authority for the proposition that claimanh
failure to report imediately is insufficient to defeat
recovery please refer to:
Smith v. Industrial Commission, 104 Utah 318,
140 P. 2d 314.
In the Baker case previously cited and in Hunter r.
Industrial Commission, 73 Ariz. 84, 237 P. 2d 813, the
Court reversed an order denying recovery upon en
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dence as to accident much less certain and uncontroverted than in the case at bar. There is no lack of evidence in the record here as to accident unless the testimony of 4 witnesses is disbelieved in its entirety.
We submit that, while it may be difficult to disagree with the Commission, the instant case is such a
case and that plaintiff is entitled to recover for a back
injury suffered by accident in the course of his employment.

CONCLUSION
That this Honorable Court should reverse the
Commission and remand the case for a determination
of plaintiff's degree of disability.
Respectfully submitted,
S. V. LI'TIZZETTE
178 South Main Street

Helper, Utah
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
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